Re: Incentive for route stabilty

[Jeremy Porter]

In message <199610260527.AAA08813@crash.ops.neosoft.com>, Scott Mace writes:
>Here's an idea that just popped into my head after NANOG.
>
>Lets assume for a moment that the majority of route instabilty is
>coming from inexperienced providers.  With that assumption in hand
>I propose the following incentive:
>
>Finanical compensation for bgp dampening policies.
>
>Deep pockets = very little flap penalty
>Shallow pockets = very heavy flap penalty
>
>Also, make the assumption that inexperienced providers arn't going
>to be able to pay for light flap penalties.  So their only choice
>is to be stable or die.
>
>I havn't thought about how or where such a policy would be applied,
>but the underlying idea would help fix the problem of routing instabilty.
>
>I know this one is out there, but I just thought I'd mention it.

Fix it in the peering agreements.
Settlements based on flap!
:)
(only half joking)

---
Jeremy Porter, Freeside Communications, Inc.      jerry@fc.net
PO BOX 80315 Austin, Tx 78708  |  1-800-968-8750  |  512-458-9810
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