North American Network Operators Group|
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Re: Where has the operational part of Nanog gone?
On Wed, 18 Nov 1998, Steve Noble wrote: > If this issue directly affected you, you should have contacted us and you > would have been given the information (as much as we could give). If you For the sake of clarification, could you please define "as much as we could give"? > were not directly affected, or you did not contact us, you should not expect > timely information. A post was made to nanog by the correct people once there > was a solution and everything was over, and yet this thread STILL goes on. It > makes me wonder if people want answers or something to complain about. It's not over till it's over. And, AFAIK, it was not over when Exodus claimed it was. In fact, do we know as a fact that it's over now? I've been routing 126.96.36.199/24 to where it belongs (Null0), so if any access attempts were made, I wouldn't have noticed... sorry to sound in the dark here. > Of course, I don't see anyone else who is posting here as an owner of one of > the other blocks, so I guess Exodus is ahead in that line. Possibly. Then again, from what I've seen, the majority of the portscanning/flooding originated from 188.8.131.52/24, not some other provider's blocks. SO... > Exodus employee's normally post durring such things as fiber cuts and real > operational issues to spread as much useful information as possible whenver > possible. I'm confused. How is a widespread network security issue not of operational concern? Thanks, -asr (speaking on behalf of myself only)