North American Network Operators Group|
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RE: More Sidgemore on per-bit pricing
> However, as long as we permit people to source traffic without cost and do > so through proxies, this problem will exist. > > This is the primary argument AGAINST anonyminity on the Internet. Your > activities, anonymous or not, are not without cost to others. The entire > premise that you have a right to "anonymous speech" is based upon the fact > that you do not directly harm others economically or otherwise be > exercising it. > > However, on the Internet, this is simply not true. "Recipient pays" > is a part of ALL Internet service, and always has been in one fashion > or another - even when the majority of traffic was moved via modems > in the 1980s and early 90s. > > Note that this is VERY different from the phone or postal service > networks, both of which are nearly 100% SENDER pays. The exception is > cellular service, and there it is a CRIMINAL ACT to call a cellular > phone on an "unsolicited" basis - that is, to cost-shift where there > is a reasonable probability that the cost is unwanted. Further all > phone traffic is authenticated and can be traced to the source; > "spoofed traffic" (beyond activity which is per-se criminal such as > cloned cellular phones) doesn't exist. > > If all transmissions had to be identifyable as to their source, and > chargeback capability was included (ie: if you spam me, I can charge > the transmission back to you - likewise if you ping-flood me) then > the problem would go away. But doing this requires strong authentication > and non-denyability of the transmission itself, which flies in the face > of those who scream for the ability to source anonymous traffic of one > form or another. > > That engineering standards have not already stabilized to prohibit > sourcing of traffic with spoofed source addresses, enforced by the > providers themselves, is very much a telling factor here. > > There wouldn't BE a DOS problem on the Internet via-a-vis ping floods, > SYN floods, etc. if the provider community refused to permit a connection > to be made without airtight packet source filters which prohibited the > transmission of data with unauthorized source addresses. > > Add to that a "chargeback" mechanism (that is, refutation of authorization > for the transmission) and per-bit pricing can work. > > Absent BOTH of those on a worldwide basis and I could never justify > recommending to anyone that they accept such a pricing system. Those price mechanisms are possible on connection-oriented networks, such as X.25 and ATM networks. On connection-less networks such as IP networks, the source will always have the right to send traffic; packet filtering and traffic shaping can cut some of the possibly unwanted traffic, but not all of them. RUbens Kuhl Jr.