Re: net.terrorism

[Alex]

> > In the history of the internet, people have been trusting each other. 
> 
> When?  I remember the RFCs on policy based routing over a decade ago.  
> Have you read them?

Thats rediculous.

Every time you setup a peer without a access-list (and don't everyone go
saying you don't do that!), you're trusting the other party not to be
AS7007.


> Announcing a netblock doesn't promise that every address in that block 
> exists or is reachable.  A network that is blocked for AUP violations
> doesn't "exist", and usually returns the ICMP message "Unreachable -- 
> Administratively Prohibited" specifically designed for such situations.  
> Have you read "Router Requirements"?

It's commonly accepted that if you announce a route, you can carry the
packet to the intended and correct destination. Existence of the host is
irrelevant; 'owning' (and I use that term loosely, ARIN) the block and
delivering it to where that netblock exists. If said 'owner' wants to
block, drop, blackhole, whatever the packet, then it is their option.

I applaud Above for trying to cut down on the Spam. But, shouldn't that be
up to UU to do, since this is a UU customer?


> It seems from the email that they clearly stated that the traffic was 
> in violation of the AUP.  We all block specific sites that harm our 
> networks.  Otherwise, there would be no capacity left for our 
> customers.  It's the "policy" part, for which BGP was designed.  Go 
> read the design RFCs.

>From what I can tell, it can't be in violaton of Above's AUP because that
enduser isn't subscribed to a service that the Above AUP applies to; also,
I doubt that UU subscribes to Above's AUP as well.