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Re: Multiple DNS implementations vulnerable to cache poisoning
At 12:41 p.m. 09/07/2008, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
It's worth noting that the basic idea of the attack isn't new. Paul Vixie described it in 1995 at the Usenix Security Conference (http://www.usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/security95/vixie.html) -- in a section titled "What We Cannot Fix", he wrote:
We have one IETF ID on port randomization for years: http://www.gont.com.ar/drafts/port-randomization/index.html
While this does not make the attack impossible, it does make it much harder.
The same thing applies to those RST attacks circa 2004.
Most of these blind attacks assume the source port numbers are easy to guess. But... why should they?
-- Fernando Gont e-mail: fernando@xxxxxxxxxxx || fgont@xxxxxxx PGP Fingerprint: 7809 84F5 322E 45C7 F1C9 3945 96EE A9EF D076 FFF1