Keynote: Securing Internet Applications from Routing Attacks
Speaker: Jennifer Rexford
Attacks on Internet routing are typically viewed through the lens of availability and confidentiality, assuming an adversary that either discards traffic or performs eavesdropping. Yet, a strategic adversary can use routing attacks to compromise the security of critical Internet applications likeTor, certificate authorities, and the bitcoin network. In this paper, we survey such application-specific routing attacks and argue that both application-layer and network-layer defenses are essential and urgently needed. While application-layer defenses are easier to deploy in the short term, we hope that our work serves to provide much needed momentum for the deployment of network-layer defenses.
Jennifer Rexford is the Gordon Y.S. Wu Professor of Engineering and the Chair of Computer Science at Princeton University. Before joining Princeton in 2005, she worked for eight years at AT&T Labs where she designed tools for network measurement, traffic engineering, and router configuration that were deployed in AT&T's backbone network. Jennifer received her BSE degree in electrical engineering from Princeton University in 1991, and her PhD degree in electrical engineering and computer science from the University of Michigan in 1996. She received the ACM SIGCOMM Award and the IEEE Internet Award, and she is an ACM Fellow, an IEEE Fellow, and a member of the National Academy of Engineering and the National Academy of Sciences.